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Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879
A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005).
Amanda Czepiel, 3L, University of Connecticut School of
Law
On July 26, 2005, the Supreme Court of New Jersey,
affirming last year’s decision of the Appellate
Division1, ruled that a private beach club could not
limit vertical or horizontal access to its dry sand beach
area for intermittent recreational purposes, although
it could charge a reasonable fee for services provided.
Background
Atlantis Beach Club (Atlantis) owns a 480-foot parcel
of upland sand beach in Lower Township, Cape May
County. The lot extends to the mean high water line.
Atlantis is located in a residential area of approxi-
mately three blocks by nine blocks, and is the only
beach in Lower Township that faces the Atlantic
Ocean. The Atlantis property was open to the public
without charge until 1996 when Atlantis established
Club Atlantis Enterprises and began charging mem-
bership fees for use of the beach and beach services.
The closest free public entry is nine blocks away and
access is limited due to a low number of available
parking spaces.
Procedural History
In 2002 Atlantis filed a complaint seeking to enjoin
the general public from “trespassing, entering and
accessing” the Atlantis property, arguing that it was
not required to provide public access to and use of its
property or the adjacent ocean.2 The Raleigh Avenue
Beach Association (Association) fought back, arguing
that Atlantis was in violation of the public trust doc-
trine. The Association claimed the doctrine required
the public be granted access to the beach through
Atlantis’s property and to a portion of the dry sand for
enjoyment of beach activities.
Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Commission,
2005 Cal. LEXIS 6846 (Cal. June 23, 2005).
Emily Plett-Miyake, 3L, Vermont Law School
On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court of California
upheld the constitutionality of the California Coastal
Commission under the separation of powers clause of
the California Constitution. In doing so, the Court
“removed the most serious legal challenge faced by
the California Coastal Commission in its three
decades as one of the state’s most powerful environ-
mental bodies.”1
Background
In 1972, a state initiative created the California
C o a s t a l  Z o n e  C o n s e r v a t i o n  C o m m i s s i o n
(Commission). Four years later, the California
Coas ta l  Ac t  o f  1976  was  enac ted ,  w i th  the
Commission having primary implementing authori-
ty. The Commission thus has authority for land use
planning along the State’s coastline, including pub-
lic access and recreation, coastal resources, and resi-
dential and industrial development. The structure of
the Commission was set up so that members are
appointed as follows: four by the State Governor,
See New Jersey, page 16
See California, page 6
New Jersey Again at Forefront of
Expanding Public Trust Doctrine
California Coastal Commission’s
Authority Upheld
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Newport Realty, Inc. v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 1021 (R.I.
2005).
Benjamin N. Spruill, 3L, Roger Williams School of Law
The Rhode Island Supreme Court recently ruled that
the public can access the Newport Harbor waterfront
via a commercial wharf despite a private landowner’s
challenge. The court found that a 1921 land transfer
reserved several streets for public use, preserving the
public’s right to access.
Background 
In 1990, Newport Realty sought to establish owner-
ship of certain streets traditionally open to the
public in Newport, Rhode Island. The streets,
North Commercial Wharf and Scott’s Wharf, are
both located on “the Wharf,” an artificial land
structure extending into the water which has his-
torical ly  provided the public  with access  to
Newport Harbor. The streets are valuable to pri-
vate landowners because they service commercial
interests located on the Wharf and the Town of
Newport, which has an interest in maintaining
public access to the waterfront. Newport Realty’s
ownership of North Commercial Wharf and Scott’s
Wharf is dependent upon a somewhat awkward
history of land conveyances. 
In 1919 Narragansett Bay Realty Company
(“Narragansett”) gained ownership of the Wharf,
including rights to all access roads located on the
Wharf. However, in 1921 the financially troubled
Narragansett conveyed the Wharf to a board of
trustees who subdivided the land.
Recorded as the First Ebbs Plat, the parcels in the
subdivided Wharf were conveyed to various parties
with proceeds going to Narragansett’s creditors.
Subsequent conveyances by the trustees in 1923 and
1924 were recorded as the Second and Third Ebbs
Plat, respectively; a final sale in 1925 completed the
work of the Trustees. Since 1925, parcels on the
Wharf have been conveyed to different owners, until
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Elizabeth Taylor, 2005 Knauss Sea Grant Fellow; J.D.,
Lewis & Clark Law School
The past few months have been busy here at the
Marine Mammal Commission. We recently held our
sixth and final plenary meeting of the advisory com-
mittee on acoustic impacts on marine mammals.
After a series of highly publicized strandings of
cetaceans coincident with exposure to mid-frequency
sonar, public concern has increased about the effects
of anthropogenic sound. A Federal  Advisory
Committee Act committee was established by the
Commission in response to a 2003 Congressional
directive to “survey acoustic ‘threats’ to marine
mammals, and develop means of reducing those
threats while maintaining the oceans as a global
highway of international commerce.” The 28-mem-
ber advisory committee includes individuals from a
diverse range of backgrounds, including the U.S.
Navy, the oil and gas industry, and environmental
groups. As one can imagine, these members have
varying goals and objectives, and professional facili-
tators were contracted to assist in finding agreement
on key recommendations to Congress. However,
finding consensus has been a difficult process and
this continues to be a highly controversial issue. 
The Commission also recently hosted a workshop
aimed at assessing the population viability of endan-
gered marine mammals in response to a 2004
Congressional directive. This was the first of a three-
phase approach to ultimately improve the biological
effectiveness of current protection programs for the
most endangered marine mammals. The Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA) employs a two-category sys-
tem: listing species either as endangered (in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its
range) or threatened (likely to become endangered in
the foreseeable future). Absence of Congressional
guidance on how to interpret the terms has left the task
of defining them to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(USFWS) and NOAA Fisheries. The workshop
involved managers from USFWS and NOAA Fisheries
as well as population modelers who are specialists in
population viability analysis in an attempt to develop
the use of quantitative methods to assist management
actions such as listing decisions and recovery pro-
grams under the ESA.
In October the Commission will hold its 2005
annual meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. The meeting
will focus on key issues impacting marine mammals in
the North Pacific ecosystem, including climate change,
coastal development, contaminants, and fishing.
1986, when Newport Realty established common
ownership of all but one of the Wharf ’s lots.
Central to Newport Realty’s ownership claim of
North Commercial Wharf and Scott’s Wharf was
whether the public gained an interest in the two
streets after the Wharf was originally subdivided in
the First Ebbs Plat from a single parcel of land.
Interpreting the law of incipient dedication, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court found for the State of
Rhode Island when it held that the streets were
reserved for public use. 
Incipient Dedication
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined, under
the doctrine of incipient dedication, that the rights of
way on North Commercial Wharf and Scott’s Wharf
belonged to the City of Newport. For the public to
receive ownership of land by incipient dedication, the
law requires that the landowner intend to convey
ownership to the public and the public accepts that
conveyance. In the case of subdivided land, the ques-
tion of “whether the streets on the plat are open to the
public depends on the owner’s intent at the time the
plat is recorded and the lots are sold.”1 In determin-
ing the Trustees’ intent in 1921, the court relied on
precedent establishing that when an owner sells lots
referenced in a recorded plan that has clearly delin-
eated public streets, it is a clear indication of an
owner’s intent to reserve the delineated streets for
public use.
Because the First Ebbs Plat was clear in its delin-
eation of North Commercial Wharf and Scott’s
Wharf streets, the court rejected Newport Realty’s
reliance on the Second and Third Ebbs Plat to negate
Reflections of a Knauss
Fellow: Part 3
See Newport, page 22
Jonathan Lew, 2L, Roger Williams University School of
Law
The landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision of
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, decided in 2001, recently
made its way back through the Rhode Island court
system to determine whether the denial of a develop-
ment permit to coastal landowner Palazzolo amounted
to a taking. While the U.S. Supreme Court found that
Palazzolo’s claim was ripe for appeal, it left open the
question of whether he could recover for a state denial
of his proposed large-scale condominium complex on
coastal wetlands. The Rhode Island Superior Court
determined Palazzolo did not show a taking of private
property without just compensation.
The Palazzolo Property & Claim
Palazzolo, president of Shore Gardens Inc. (SGI),
acquired Rhode Island coastal property in 1959. Six
prime lots on which houses could be easily built were
immediately conveyed to other owners; the remainder
of the property, a salt marsh located on the south side
of Winnapaug Pond, was located on such permeable
ground that any attempt to build would first require
considerable fill. 
In 1971, Rhode Island created the Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC) to
protect the State’s coastal properties and the Council
subsequently enacted the Rhode Island Coastal
Resources Management Program (CRMP), which des-
ignated salt marshes as protected coastal wetlands on
which development is greatly limited. In 1978, SGI’s
corporate charter was revoked and Palazzolo became
the sole landowner. He filed proposals to fill the
marsh in order to build condominium complexes, all
of which were denied because they conflicted with the
CRMP and did not satisfy the standards for obtaining
a special exception.
Palazzolo filed an inverse condemnation action
asserting that the denial of his permit applications
amounted to a taking of his property without compen-
sation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The initial trial was held in 1997 and
the Rhode Island Superior Court entered a judgment
for the State. The Superior Court found that no taking
had occurred because the state regulations precluding
the development predated Palazzolo’s ownership of the
parcel. The Superior Court also found that the devel-
opment contemplated by Palazzolo would constitute a
public nuisance and bar him from compensation. On
appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the
Superior Court’s decision by finding that the appeal
was not ripe for decision because while the CRMC
denied Palazzolo’s application, it never made a final
decision as to what land, if any, could be developed.
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed this
decision finding that Palazzolo’s acquisition of title
after the regulations took effect is not an automatic bar
to a takings claim, explaining that “[f]uture genera-
tions, too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limi-
tations on the use and value of land.”1 Moreover, the
Court found the case was ripe for decision because it
would be futile to force Palazzolo to continue to submit
additional plans when the initial proposal was rejected
and the State effectively determined which portion of
the land in question could be developed. Consequently,
the Supreme Court remanded the case back to Rhode
Island to conduct a takings analysis, known as the Penn
Central test, on the facts of the case.2
Nuisance
Before conducting the Penn Central analysis, the
Rhode Island Superior Court revisited its original
conclusion that Palazzolo’s proposed development
would constitute a public nuisance, precluding a ver-
dict on his takings claim. The Supreme Court has
found that there can be no taking in a case where a
proposed use is prohibited by nuisance law.3 The state
used the theory of anticipatory nuisance because a
“court may enjoin a threatened or anticipated nui-
sance, public or private, where it clearly appears that a
nuisance will necessarily result from the contemplat-
ed act or things which it is sought to enjoin.”4 The
state argued that Palazzolo’s proposed development, a
large scale condominium complex, constituted a nui-
sance because it would adversely affect the environ-
ment by increasing nitrogen levels and reducing
marshland, which filters runoff. The court agreed,
also holding that the marshland has a unique charac-
ter and such a large complex would obstruct views and
jeopardize the pristine nature of the location. 
Penn Central Test
The Penn Central test guides a court in determining
whether a taking has occurred by measuring the
impact regulations have on property. The three factors
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Rhode Island Court Resolves Palazzolo
Palazzolo v. State, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. July 5, 2005).
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that set the framework for the test are (1) the character
of governmental action, (2) the economic impact of
the action on the claimant, and (3) the extent to which
the action interfered with the claimant’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations.
Regarding the character of the state’s action,
Palazzolo has claimed a partial regulatory taking
because the state regulation has banned certain uses
of his property. Palazzolo argued for compensation
because the cost for preserving wetlands should be
borne by taxpayers and not by him as an individual
property owner. The Superior Court found this argu-
ment to be unpersuasive because the same regulation
affects the surrounding landowners and it is impracti-
cal for the government to compensate each and every
landowner for their inability to develop large-scale
complexes on unsuitable land. 
Regarding the second prong of the Penn Central
test, Palazzolo based his economic impact upon two
theories. First, Palazzolo claimed the State denied him
his entire planned development and he should be
compensated based on a fifty-lot subdivision. The sec-
ond theory is based on whether or not half of
Palazzolo’s property is subject to the Public Trust
Doctrine. If the Superior Court found that half of his
property lies below the mean high
water  l ine ,  tha t  por t ion  o f
Palazzolo’s property would be sub-
ject to the Public Trust Doctrine and
held by Rhode Island in trust.
Palazzolo concedes that if  the
Superior Court finds half of his land
to be subject to the Public Trust
Doctrine than he should only be
compensated for a 17-lot subdivi-
sion. 
The difficulty in determining
Palazzolo’s economic impact rested
on the reliability of trial experts and
real estate appraisers. Palazzolo’s
engineer estimated that it would
cost over $460,000 to provide the
infrastructure and site work for the
17-home development and over $1
million to accommodate the 50-
home development, while the State’s expert estimated
that the development costs of the 50-lot subdivision
would be almost $3.9 million and the development
costs of the 17-lot subdivision would be $1.3 million.
Ultimately, the Superior Court found the State’s
expert more reliable because the “fatal flaw in the
plaintiff ’s profit estimate is principally due to the site
preparation costs determined by Plaintiff ’s engi-
neer.”5 Among other factors, Palazzolo’s engineer
lacked experience with marshland development and
failed to use the most accurate pricing information,
which led to figures that were “unreasonably low and
unreliable.”6 The court ultimately found that “regard-
less of any diminution of parcel size available for
development due to the Public Trust Doctrine, site
development costs unique to the parcel in question
would result in an economic loss.”7 The court also
relied upon “average reciprocity of advantage” stating
that Palazzolo and the surrounding marshland owners
are receiving a benefit from the undeveloped marsh-
land if it remains pristine in nature.
Regarding the final prong, the Superior Court
found that Palazzolo’s “investment backed expecta-
tions were not realistically achievable.”8 It refused to
recognize Palazzolo’s development proposals as rea-
sonable because any expectations would have been
modest at best. Palazzolo paid a modest sum to invest
in this subdivision with his partner, Urso, an attorney
with prior real estate experience. After the six prime
lots were sold, Urso, who understood the difficulties of
developing the marshland and wanting to avoid a bad
investment, sold out to Palazzolo. In addition, none of
the surrounding marshland owners had developed
any significant portion of the marshland, especially
for a development the size of Palazzolo’s proposed
development, and Palazzolo was aware that such a sig-
nificant development would have to be approved by
See Palazzolo, page 22
Photograph courtesy of the Community Rights Counsel (CRC), 
http://www.communityrights.org/legalresources/recentsupremecourtopinions/Palazzoloaerialview1.asp .
four by the Speaker of the Assembly, and the remain-
ing four by the Senate Committee on Rules. Each
serves two-year terms “at the pleasure of their
appointing authority.”2 The Commission is empow-
ered to take a variety of actions, such as hearing
applications for coastal permits, promulgating regu-
lations, and issuing cease and desist orders halting
illegal development.
Marine Forests Society is a nonprofit corporation
whose purpose “is the development of an experimen-
tal research program for the creation of so-called
marine forests to replace lost marine habitat.”3 Their
objective is to discover economically feasible means
of creating “marine forests” to replace lost habitat. As
part of their project, Marine Forests began depositing
materials, including “used tires, plastic jugs, and con-
crete blocks, on a sandy plain of the ocean off Newport
Harbor.”4 The project received approval from the
City of Newport Beach, the California Department of
Fish and Game, and the California Integrated Waste
Management Board. They did not receive approval,
however, from the Commission, and in fact, they did
not apply for a permit. In June 1993, the Commission
informed Marine Forests that it was required to apply
to the Commission for a permit in order to conduct
its activities. Two years later, in 1995, Marine Forests
applied for an “after-the-fact” permit, which the
Commission denied in 1997. The Commission next
began to commence enforcement proceedings against
Marine Forests to compel it to cease and desist per-
forming the contested operations. Two years later, the
Commission issued a “Notice of Intent to Commence
Cease and Desist Order Proceedings” against Marine
Forests. In response, Marine Forests filed suit against
the Commission for declaratory and injunctive relief,
seeking to enjoin the Commission from pursuing
enforcement actions against them. Marine Forests
argued that the Commission lacked authority to pur-
sue enforcement proceedings, because 
a majority of the voting members of the
Commission were appointed by the Senate
Rules Committee and the Speaker of the
Assembly and served at the will of their
appointing authority, the Coastal Com-
mission must be considered a “legislative
body” for purposes of the separation of pow-
ers clause of the California Constitution and
that the Commission therefore lacked the
authority either to grant, deny, or condition a
permit (a power the complaint characterized
as an “executive power”) or to conduct a hear-
ing and issue a cease and desist order (a
power the complaint characterized as a “judi-
cial power”).5
The trial court agreed with the plaintiff and
issued an injunction preventing the Commission
from granting or denying coastal permits, or issuing
cease and desist orders. The Commission appealed to
the California Court of Appeals in 2002. Based on an
examination of the separation of powers doctrine, the
court affirmed the decision of the trial court and rein-
stated the injunction.
Since the decision at the Court of Appeals level,
the Commission has undergone some structural
changes, accomplished through amendments to the
Coastal Act. The Commission is still made up of
twelve members,  four appointed each by the
Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the
Senate Rules Committee. While those appointed by
the Governor continue to serve two-year terms “at the
pleasure of their appointing authority,” the members
appointed by the Senate Rules Committee and
Speaker of the Assembly are now appointed for a
four-year term and are no longer removable by the
appointing authority.
Separation of Powers
The California Supreme Court determined it would
evaluate the new, not the old, appointment structure
under the separation of powers challenge. The court
declined to review the validity of the past structure of
the Commission, finding that “it is clear under a long
and uniform line of California precedents that the
validity of the judgment must be determined on the
basis of the current statutory provisions, rather than
on the basis of statutory provisions that were in effect
at the time the injunctive order was entered . . .
Because relief by injunction operates in the future,
appeals of injunctions are governed by the law in
effect at the time the appellate court gives its deci-
sions.”6 The court also stressed that the correct sepa-
ration of powers doctrine under which to test the
structure of the Commission is that of the California
Constitution, rather than the federal Constitution
and federal separation of powers doctrine. While the
federal separation of powers doctrine may have
resulted in a different outcome, this was not the case
under the state doctrine. 
The California Constitution states that “the pow-
ers of state government are legislative, executive, and
judicial. Persons charged with the exercise of one
power may not exercise either of the others except as
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permitted by this Constitution.”7 Looking to state
common law, the court noted that “Although the lan-
guage of California Constitution article III, section 3,
may suggest a sharp demarcation between the opera-
tions of the three branches of government, California
decisions have long recognized that, in reality, the
separation of powers doctrine ‘does not mean that the
three departments of our government are not in many
respects mutually dependent’, or that the actions of
one branch may not significantly affect those of
another branch. Indeed . . . the substantial interrelat-
edness of the three branches’ action is apparent and
commonplace.”8 In contrast with the federal
Constitution, the state Constitution does not grant
the Governor or executive  exclusive appointment
authority for all executive officials or prohibit the
Legislature from doing so. 
The Court then examined whether the current
structure of the Commission was permissible. They
found nothing to support a finding that the structure
of the Commission, as brought before them, violated
the separation of powers doctrine. The Court evaluat-
ed the structure using the appropriate standard:
“whether these provisions, viewed from a realistic
and practical perspective, operate to defeat or materi-
ally impair the executive branch’s exercise of its con-
stitutional function.”  In doing so, the Court consid-
ered “whether the statutes either (1) improperly
intrude upon a core zone of executive authority,
impermissibly impeding the Governor . . . in the
exercise of his or her executive authority or func-
tions, or (2) retain undue legislative control . . . com-
promising the ability of the legislative appointees to
the Coastal Commission . . . to perform their execu-
tive functions independently, without legislative
coercion or interference.”  The Court found that
the current structure of the Commission did no
such thing, and is permissible and valid under
the state separation of powers doctrine.
Validity of Past and Pending Commission
Decisions
The Court acknowledged that more serious
questions about the validity of the structure did
exist before the 2003 amendments, but declined
to issue a finding of whether it violated the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine.  In addition, they
found that past Commission decisions and
actions should be held valid regardless of the
ultimate validity of the structure under which
they were made. The Court recognized that
statutes of limitations bar complaints against
many of the estimated 100,000 vulnerable decisions.
In addition, and more conclusively for recent and
pending decisions of the Commission, the Court
found that “under the ‘de facto officer’ doctrine prior
actions of the Commission cannot be set aside on the
ground that the appointment of the commissioners
who participated in the decision may be vulnerable to
constitutional challenge . . . the lawful acts of an offi-
cer de facto, so far as the rights of third persons are
concerned, are, if done within the scope and by the
apparent authority of office, as valid and binding as if
he were the officer elected and qualified for the office
and in full possession of it.”9 This legal principle,
designed to give agencies and officers as well as the
public for whom they operate a sense of certainty and
finality, precluded any finding that the past and
pending decisions of the Commission were invalid.
Conclusion
The conclusion of the case has been met with mixed
response. Marine Forests and various property rights
groups, including the Pacific Legal Foundation,
expressed disappointment. “I thought we would have
some members of the court going our way,” remarked
James Burling, head of the Property Rights Division of
the Pacific Legal Foundation.10 Ronald Zumbrun, who
represented Marine Forests, expressed unhappiness
that the case was not considered under the old law,
rather than the new. Arguing against what his client,
French researcher and head of Marine Forests
Rodolphe Streichenberger, has called a “totalitarian
tribunal,” he also expressed shock at some of the analy-
sis in the opinion.11 On the other hand, Commission
members and supporters were happy with the out-
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Photograph courtesy of the California Environmental Protection Agency.
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Alaska v. Dupier, 2005 Alas. LEXIS 123 (Alaska Aug.
12, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
The Alaska Supreme Court recently held that the
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (CFEC)
did not exceed its authority when it required federal-
ly permitted fishermen to possess state interim-use
permits to land their catches. The decision was con-
trary to the earlier holdings of the District Court and
Court of Appeals. 
Background
John Dupier, Rodman Miller, and Philip Twohy hold
Individual Fishing Quotas (IFQs) to fish for halibut
and sablefish in federal waters off Alaska. In 2001,
the three fishermen separately attempted to land fish
caught in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in
Alaska. The men did not possess any state permits.
The CFEC charged them with “possessing commer-
cially taken fish in state waters without having a valid
interim-use permit.”1
In Alaska it is unlawful to “operate gear in the
commercial taking of fishery resources without a valid
entry permit or a valid interim-use permit issued by”
the CFEC.2 For non-limited entry fisheries, the CFEC
is required to issue interim-use permits to “all appli-
cants who can establish their present ability to partic-
ipate actively in the fishery.”3 If a fishermen does not
hold a limited entry permit or interim-use permit, he
may not deliver or land fish in Alaska unless he holds
a valid federal permit and has been issued a landing
permit by the CFEC.4 The CFEC may only issue land-
ing permits after the Commissioner of the Fish and
Game “has made a written finding that the issuance of
landing permits for that fishery is consistent with
state resource conservation and management goals.”5
The CFEC has never issued landing permits.
Interim-Use vs. Landing Permits
The statutory permitting regime seems straightfor-
ward on paper. In practice, it has been anything but.
For fishermen fishing in state waters, the process is
pretty clear. But what about fishermen operating out-
side of state waters? There are a number of federal
fisheries in Alaska, including salmon, halibut, and
sablefish. According to Alaska Stat. § 16.05.675, if
fishermen want to land fish caught in federal waters,
the fishermen must possess a federal permit (which
authorizes the harvest) and a landing permit to land
their catch. 
Unfortunately, landing permits have never been
issued by the CFEC. The Department of Fish and
Game has yet to issue regulations authorizing the
CFEC to issue landing permits. To fill this gap, the
CFEC requires federally permitted fishermen to
obtain interim-use permits even though the fisher-
men have no intention of fishing in state waters. The
CFEC regulations state that “it is unlawful for any
person to possess within water subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the state, any fish or shellfish, taken for a com-
mercial purpose, . . . unless the person has in his pos-
session a valid interim-use or entry permit card. . .”6
“A person reporting a landing of fish under a federal
individual fishing quota (IFQ) possesses fish for a
commercial purpose.”7
The district court invalidated this regulatory pro-
vision and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court
of Appeals held that “the CFEC is only authorized to
issue interim-use permits to fishers participating in
fisheries that are potentially subject to limited entry
by the CFEC.”8 The halibut and sablefish fisheries are
not potentially subject to limited entry by the CFEC
because they are managed by the federal government.
The State defended its regulation by urging a
broad reading of §16.43.210 which at the time autho-
rized the state to issue interim-use permits “pending
the establishment of a maximum number of entry
permits.” The State claimed this phrase gave CFEC
“the authority to issue interim-use permits for any
fishery in which it has not limited entry, regardless of
who manages that fishery.”9 The Court of Appeals
found this interpretation to be unreasonable as it
would oblige the CFEC “to issue an interim-use per-
mit to any qualified applicant to fish in any fishery in
the world.”10 The court held that a more reasonable
interpretation of §16.43.210 is that it requires CFEC
to issue interim-use permits to applicants seeking to
fish in fisheries to which entry has not been limited,
“that is fisheries over which the CFEC has authority
to limit entry or impose a moratorium, but has not
yet done so.”11 The Supreme Court disagreed. It
found that §16.43.210 was meant to apply to every
Fishermen in Federal Waters Need State
Permit to Land Catch in Alaska
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fishery not limited by the CFEC. Since the CFEC has
not limited entry to the halibut and sablefish fish-
eries, the CFEC could issue interim-use permits.
Apparently it does not matter that the CFEC does not
have the authority to limit entry to the halibut and
sablefish fishery. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning begs the ques-
tion: if CFEC has authority to issue interim-use per-
mits for federal fisheries, why did the legislature
authorize landing permits? The Supreme Court found
that the legislature created landing permits in 1984
only for a “narrow class of fishers.” In 1984, a salmon
fisherman with a federal permit for the salmon troll
fishery sought to land his catch in Alaska. Because he
did not have a state interim-use permit or entry per-
mit, he was prohibited from landing his catch. Before
litigation ensued, the legislature passed a bill giving
the Commissioner of Fish and Game discretion to
authorize CFEC to issue landing permits. 
Because the legislature could have directed the
CFEC to issue interim-use permits in this situation,
the Court of Appeals concluded that the legislature
intended landing permits to be issued when “a fisher
with a valid federal permit to harvest fish in the EEZ
wants to land that fish in Alaska but holds no entry or
interim-use permit.”12 The Supreme Court, however,
distinguished the defendants’ situation from that of
the salmon fisherman. Unlike the halibut and sable-
fish fisheries, Alaska’s salmon fisheries were subject to
limited entry by the state in 1984. A federally permit-
ted salmon fisherman would have been unable to
obtain an entry or interim-use permit. The court found
the defendants, unlike the salmon fisherman, could
have procured interim-use permits since CFEC has
not limited entry to the halibut and sablefish fishery.
The defendants challenged the CFEC’s position
that they could have received interim-use permits.
The federal IFQ program allows corporations, firms,
and associations to participate. The CFEC, however,
only issues interim-use permits to individuals. The
State claimed that corporations participating in the
IFQ program must assign their quota shares to a nat-
ural person who harvests the fish. That person would
be eligible to apply for a CFEC permit. The court did
not rule on this issue, but acknowledged that respon-
dents could seek to disprove the State’s assertion at
trial. If the defendants can prove that they could not
obtain CFEC permits, they may be able to succeed on
a federal preemption claim as Alaska would be pro-
hibiting them from landing fish legally harvested
under federal law.
Conclusion
The court’s conclusions appear to be based more on
sympathy for the CFEC’s position than on the
statutes passed by the legislature. The CFEC was in
an awkward spot. It should have required landing
permits, but the Commissioner of Fish and Game
had not created a regulatory scheme authorizing it to
do so. Because all fishermen need a CFEC permit to
land fish, it required the only one that was available -
an interim-use permit. 
This is a classic example of lawyers making things
more complicated than they need to be. Since no one
was challenging the authority of the state to require
fishermen to possess landing permits, it would have
seemed more logical for the court to order the
Commissioner of Fish and Game to develop regula-
tions authorizing the CFEC to issue landing permits
than to force the defendants to pay a fine for not
applying for permits inapplicable to their situation.
Endnotes
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Fishing vessel underway in Kodiak Harbor. Photograph from the NOAA Photo
Library, photographer Charlie Ess, NMFS.
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Oceana v. Evans, 2005 WL 1847303 (D.D.C. August 2,
2005).
Britta Hinrichsen, 3L, Vermont Law School
In August, the District Court for the District of
Columbia issued a lengthy opinion regarding the
legality of the Atlantic Scallop Fishery Management
Plan. The court held that the National Marine
Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) no jeopardy decision was
not irrational and that the agency considered a rea-
sonable range of alternatives to protect essential fish
habitat from the adverse impacts of scallop dredging.
The court, however, remanded a few sections of the
amendment to the agency for violations of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act.
Background
Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation
and Management Act (MSA), the New England
Fisheries Management Council (Council) has author-
ity to amend the Atlantic Sea Scallop Fishery
Management Plan (FMP or Scallop FMP). Since
1994, the scallop fishery has been a limited access
fishery with designated annual days at sea and the
Council has the authority to open or close areas to
scallop harvest. In 2000, the Council developed
Amendment 10, which proposed a formal rotational
closure system to “focus fishing effort on larger, more
valuable scallops in area[s] where the effort is more
efficient.”1 In addition to creating a structured rota-
tion program based on the productivity of the scal-
lops, Amendment 10 proposed measures to minimize
adverse effects to essential fish habitat (EFH). While
finalizing Amendment 10, NMFS used interim frame-
work adjustments to manage the scallop fishery.
Framework 16 established the first rotational access
areas for Amendment 10, allowed for scallop dredging
in areas of the Georges Bank closed to groundfish har-
vesting, provided more days at sea in those areas, and
revised the EFH closed areas to be consistent with
other amendments to the Scallop FMP. Oceana
brought a number of claims against the Secretary of
Commerce under the MSA, Endangered Species Act
(ESA), and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) chal-
lenging the agency’s actions regarding Amendment 10
and Framework 16 of the Scallop FMP.
Biological Opinion
To comply with the ESA, NMFS conducted formal
consultation to determine if the authorization of
Amendment 10 would jeopardize endangered logger-
head sea turtles. NMFS issued a Biological Opinion
(BO), which found that continued authorization of
the scallop fishery would not jeopardize the existence
of the loggerhead sea turtles, although NMFS esti-
mated that 479 turtles would be killed annually as a
result of scallop fishing. In developing the 2004 BO,
NMFS used a model originally designed to determine
the impacts of shrimp trawling on sea turtles in the
Gulf of Mexico, because that was the only data and
model available. Oceana does not dispute that the
model is the best available science. Rather, Oceana
argues that the model is so ill-suited to the scallop
fishery that the agency could not have rationally con-
cluded that the fishery was not likely to jeopardize
the turtles’ survival.
The court disagreed. The necessary data simply
does not exist and NMFS determined in the absence
of that data the old model was the best alternative.
The court indicates that the “agency needs only a rea-
soned basis for concluding that its action is ‘not like-
ly’ to jeopardize the species” and the court will defer
to such agency decision unless the model “bears no
rational relationship to the reality it purports to rep-
resent.”2 The model was designed to help NMFS
understand population trends in response to new
conservation measures and it is the best available.
Oceana offered several alternatives to the model, but
the court found that they did not provide the agency
with a better analysis because “no reliable estimates
of absolute population size” were known and nesting
data does not provide “statistically reliable trends”
for loggerhead populations.3
Oceana also challenged NMFS’s definition of
“action area.” The ESA defines “action area” as “all
areas to be affected directly or indirectly by the
Federal action and not merely the immediate area
involved in the action.”4 For the purposes of the
2004 BO, NMFS defines the action area as “the area
in which the scallop fishery operates.”5 Oceana
argued this definition operated to exclude signifi-
cant sources of other mortality such as habitat loss
and nesting predation. The court found the defini-
tion proper for limiting the BO to those areas where
District Court Upholds Most of Atlantic
Scallop Fishery Management Plan
loggerhead sea turtles are actually impacted by scal-
lop fishing. The court found there was no support
for “the proposition that the action area must be
extended to include the migratory range of logger-
head turtles.”6
Bycatch Reporting
Oceana claimed that Amendment 10 fails
to establish an adequate bycatch
reporting program. The court
agreed. A FMP must include a
standard reporting method-
ology of bycatch to assess
quant i ty  and  type  o f
bycatch for the fishery,
and conservation and
management measures to
minimize bycatch and the
mortality of unavoidable
bycatch.7 In Amendment
10 the Council proposed
expanding its observer pro-
gram in the sea scallop fishery,
but “the FMP does not indi-
cate what an appropriate
increase would be, or how
bycatch hotspots are to be deter-
mined.”8 Rather than creating a
method of reporting, Amendment 10
merely grants “complete discretion
to the Regional Administrator” and establishes a one-
percent funding set-aside for at-sea observation of
bycatch.9 Because Amendment 10 fails to establish a
methodology for bycatch reporting, the court remand-
ed that portion of the Amendment for revision in
accordance with the MSA.
Framework Actions
Oceana also argued that Amendment 10 unlawfully
delegates FMP adjustments to the framework action
process. The MSA authorizes the agency to issue
FMPs as well as amendments and regulations to those
FMPs, each of which requires public notice and
opportunity for comment. To respond to quickly
changing conditions in fish populations, however, the
Council uses “framework adjustments,” which do not
require public notice and comment.  Because
Amendment 10 creates a “rotational area manage-
ment” scheme that depends on changes in scallop
productivity, the Council argues that it needs to be
able to quickly adjust management of the harvest
areas when new data on scallop populations is avail-
able. Oceana challenged the future use of framework
adjustments for the Scallop FMP.
The court found Oceana’s challenge to the frame-
work adjustment process not ripe for judicial review.
Amendment 10 identifies different options for the
agency to respond to changes in the scallop popula-
tions, and the future use of the framework
adjustment process may be within the
authori ty  of  the  MSA i f  such
changes are made to better meet
the objectives of the Scallop
FMP. If NMFS utilizes the
framework process and ex-
ceeds the authority under
the MSA, the plaintiff may
then raise this challenge.
Oceana’s other suc-
cess fu l  c la im was  tha t
Framework 16, which im-
plemented Amendment 10,
violated the MSA. Without
any opportunity for public
c o m m e n t ,  Fr a m e w o r k  1 6
revised the scallop closure areas
to be consistent with the Groundfish
FMP. The court found the agency
could make this change, but it must
do so as a “modification” to the FMP
rather than a framework adjust-
ment, because modifications are subject to public
notice and comment.
Conclusion
Amendment 10 to the Scallop FMP may be imple-
mented as proposed by the agency, except for the
two provisions remanded to the lower court; 1)
establishment of a bycatch reporting methodology,
and 2) a modification of the habitat closures.
Endnotes
1. Oceana v. Evans, 2005 WL 1847303, at *1 (D.D.C.
August 2, 2005).
2. Id. at *10-11.
3. Id. at *7. 
4. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.
5. Oceana, 2005 WL 1847303, at *17.
6. Id. at *19.
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8. Id. at *80.
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Volume 4, No. 3  The SandBar Page 11
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Northeast Ohio Reg’l Sewer Dist., et al. v. EPA, 411 F.3d
726 (6th Cir. 2005).
Jeffery Schiffman, 3L, Cleveland-Marshall College of
Law (Cleveland State University)
In June, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the finding of the EPA that Indiana’s and Ohio’s reg-
ulatory schemes to address toxic discharges into the
Great Lakes were inconsistent with EPA guidance.
Background 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires polluters to
obtain National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permits for their discharges.
These permits must include restrictions on pollu-
tion discharge, and when necessary, Whole Effluent
Toxicity (WET) limitations. Permitting authorities
are authorized to impose WET limitations when
there is “a reasonable potential” of a water quality
violation.
In 1995, to protect water quality in the Great
Lakes, the EPA issued “Final Water Quality Guidance
for the Great Lakes System” (the Guidance).1 The
eight Great Lakes states were free to establish their
own procedures and regulations in implementing the
Guidance, as long as their regulations provide the
same or a greater level of protection as the Guidance.2
If a state fails to meet this goal, the EPA is authorized
to impose its own standards.3
The Guidance provides some procedures for
establishing WET limits. Samples are taken from a
facility’s discharge and marine organisms are
exposed to those samples and a control group. Tests
are performed to determine the percentage of organ-
isms which die upon exposure to the facility’s dis-
charge. The percentage of deaths that occur is called
a toxic unit; the highest toxic unit measured in a set
time period is then multiplied by a predetermined
statistical variable. If the resulting value exceeds the
EPA’s predetermined criterion, a WET limitation
should be imposed.
Indiana and Ohio submitted their schemes in
1997. EPA concluded that neither state’s regulations
were consistent with the Guidance. Indiana’s proce-
dure used a geometric mean of all the values sampled,
rather than the Guidance’s recommended maximum
value from all WET tests during a set period. Indiana
also did not plan to use a statistically based multipli-
er in the analysis. Ohio, on the other hand, adopted a
weight of the evidence approach requiring authorities
to examine a variety of factors to determine whether
to impose WET limits. Ohio also chose not to use a
statistically based multiplier in its analysis. 
In December of 2000 a group of Ohio parties
appealed EPA’s decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. A similar group from Indiana appealed to
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs
contended that the EPA erred in concluding that
their  regulations were inconsistent with the
Guidance. Plaintiffs argued that their proposed reg-
ulations were at least as protective of water quality as
the Guidance. The EPA moved to transfer the
Indiana case from the Seventh Circuit to the Sixth
Circuit to combine it with the suit already filed by
the Ohio group. The motion was granted in the
spring of 2001.
Indiana
The Indiana regulations differed from the Guidance
in two ways. First, the Indiana proposal required
water toxicity to be measured using a geometric mean
of tested values. The Guidance calls for using a maxi-
mum tested value to determine toxicity. Such a maxi-
mum value is mathematically greater than a geomet-
ric mean. Under the Indiana proposal, a facility’s
effluent toxicity would have to be consistently higher
than the mean in order to trigger a WET limit.
Second, the Indiana proposal did not use a statistical
multiplier as required by the Guidance, but rather an
independently derived factor.
Indiana asserted that its proposal was more pro-
tective of the environment than the Guidance. The
EPA disagreed because “a maximum value taken
from a sample will necessarily be greater than the
geometric mean of a sample.” The Court held EPA
acted rationally when it rejected the Indiana propos-
al. EPA concluded that the state’s use of a geometric
mean would result in fewer WET limits than a
scheme using maximum values, which would be less
protective of the environment. EPA’s decision, there-
fore, was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Indiana and Ohio Failed to Comply
with EPA Water Quality Guidance
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Ohio
Ohio’s proposed scheme allowed permitting authori-
ties to consider a variety of data on discharge toxicity
when issuing a permit or WET limit. This “weight of
evidence” standard included such things as the mag-
nitude of discharge, the degree and type of effect, and
the quality/quantity of each type of data. Only dis-
charges that met a variety of factors would receive
WET limits. Ohio argued this provided a comprehen-
sive approach to water quality that is more protective
of the environment than the Guidance. However, the
court felt this could be read as giving permitting
authorities too much freedom, while not providing
enough guidance on weighing the various factors.
Ohio’s scheme was held to be less protective than the
Guidance which used a statistically determined mul-
tiplier to calculate toxicity.
Pursuant to Ohio’s scheme, authorities could not
issue a WET limit without biological data, unless: (1)
the maximum measured toxicity was three times
greater than expected; (2) the average toxicity
exceeded one-third the expected limit; and (3) more
than 30 percent of the test results exceeded a project-
ed value. Ohio conceded that such a scheme could
result in less protection than afforded under the
Guidance. The state further conceded that toxic dis-
charges would occur in situations where no biological
data was available. Ohio defended its regulations
arguing that if the data set was larger, the scheme
would require WET limits where the Guidance did
not. Ohio argued such a trade-off in protections was
allowable, and thus the EPA’s rejection of its plan was
arbitrary and capricious.
The Court found that EPA did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously in rejecting the Ohio
scheme. While the EPA’s final decision did
not address Ohio’s more protective provi-
sions, the fact that Ohio would allow toxic
discharges in certain situations in direct
conflict with the Guidance neutralized any
positive effects of its more protective mea-
sures.
Scientifically Indefensible
Ohio and Indiana also argued that the
WET testing set forth in the Guidance was
“‘not scientifically defensible’ because of
the huge variation introduced by taking
only maximum tested values and utilizing
an independent statistical multiplier.”4
The Guidance itself provides that if a state
could demonstrate that a procedure was not scientifi-
cally defensible, then a state could either provide an
alternative methodology for defining water quality or
apply an alternative procedure.5 Both states argued
their schemes were appropriate alternatives. EPA
countered that flexibility was built into the Guidance
to allow for regulators to address future pollutants
which might not have an adequate methodology
under the Guidance. EPA further argued that the
indefensible exception was for specific situations,
rather than across-the-board regulatory schemes. The
Court found both of EPA’s arguments convincing;
WET discharges are not future pollutants and the sci-
entifically indefensible excuse is not available for
common discharges.
Conclusion
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
findings of the EPA that Indiana’s and Ohio’s regula-
tory schemes were inconsistent with agency guid-
ance. At press time, Indiana and Ohio had filed a
petition for rehearing which was pending before the
Sixth Circuit. Federally-promulgated regulations are
currently in effect and apply until the two states
bring their programs into compliance.6
Endnotes
1. 60 Fed. Reg. 15366 (March 23, 1995).
2. 40 C.F.R. § 132.5(g)(3).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1268(c)(2)(C).
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Sediment sampling aboard EPA research vessel, “Mudpuppy”, Indiana Harbor Canal, East
Chicago, IN. Photograph courtesy of the USEPA, ARCS program.
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City of Bainbridge Island v. Brennan, 2005 Wash. App.
LEXIS 1744 (Wash. App. July 20, 2005).
Sabena Singh, 3L, South Texas College of Law
On July 20, 2005, the Court of Appeals of Washington
held that a dedicated right-of-way laid out to naviga-
ble waters is presumed to provide access to the
water’s edge. 
Facts
Bainbridge Island, located 35 minutes by ferry from
Seattle, is home to quiet harbors, farms, and a rich
history. Bainbridge Island grew from a small town of
two square miles with 3,147 people to a bustling com-
munity of 20,920. Over the years, it has managed to
uphold its friendly aura, small town charm, and nat-
ural environments. 
In 1898, Peder Erlandsen purchased 32 acres on
Bainbridge Island, which adjoined, but did not
include, the tidelands of Fletcher Bay. Over the years,
a county road was built across Erlandsen’s property to
provide access to the beach and later a wharf that
extended from the end of the road into the bay. In
1911, Erlandsen dedicated for public use all the
streets and avenues on his property, which included
the county road. Soon thereafter, Erlandsen received
title to all of the tidelands adjoining his property.
A few years later, a private ferry company began
providing service between Fletcher Bay and the
Kitsap Peninsula. Customers accessed the ferry via
the county road and the wharf. In 1923, Erlandsen
dedicated an additional 40-foot right-of-way to
accommodate a change in the county road’s route fol-
lowing a county improvement project. The public fre-
quently used the wharf and the surrounding beach to
dig clams and moor their boats, even after the ferry
service was discontinued in 1941 and the wharf dis-
mantled.
Erlandsen died in 1943 and his property, includ-
ing the tidelands, was eventually subdivided. Some of
the new lot owners began challenging the public’s use
of the tidelands going so far as to build a fence and
erecting a locked gate to blocked access. 
In 1999, the City of Bainbridge Island (City)
which had acquired an undivided 2/20 interest in the
tidelands, sued to quiet title to the road and tide-
lands. The trial court quieted title in favor of the City
holding that “the land-based portion of Fletcher
Landing was dedicated to the public as a public road
right-of-way to the western edge of the concrete bulk-
head built in 1924 and still presently on site.”1 A few
of the record owners of tideland parcels appealed.
Dedication to Public Use
Appellants made several claims on appeal. First,
appellants contended that the City failed to prove that
Erlandsen intended to dedicate the tidelands to public
use. Under Washington state law, “a dedication is gen-
erally defined as the devotion of property to a public
use by an unequivocal act of the owner, manifesting an
intention that it shall be accepted and used presently
or in the future.”2 The elements that indicate a dedica-
tion are (1) intention of the owner to dedicate and (2)
acceptance by the public. The court determined that
Erlandsen’s conduct before and after he purchased the
tidelands indicated his intention to dedicate them for
public use and that the public accepted this dedica-
tion. The court cited well-established Washington law
that “when a public highway is laid out to navigable
waters, its terminus is presumed to be a public land-
ing as incident to the highway.”3 Since the public fre-
quently used the tidelands, the court found that the
two elements were clearly satisfied. 
The record owners also argued that they were
bona fide purchasers for value and therefore entitled
to exclusive use of the property. Under Washington
law, “where there is an apparent dedication to public
use, or where such a dedication may be inferred or
suggested from the condition of the property, the pur-
chaser is put on notice and cannot defeat the right of
the public therein, should such a right in fact exist;
and this is so regardless of the state of the record title
or of the recitals in his deed.”4 This court agreed with
the trial court’s finding that the record owners had
knowledge of the land’s dedication for public use,
and were therefore put on notice and could not defeat
the right of the public. The court reasoned that the
physical attributes and location of the property
should have put appellants on notice that the land
was dedicated for public use or, at the very least, put
them on notice of the need to inquire further.
Washington Court Protects Public Access
to Tidelands on Bainbridge Island
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Public Trust Doctrine
A cross appeal was filed by the Larsons who owned
waterfront property close to the tidelands. Because of
their property’s steep bank, they used the tidelands to
launch their small boats and gain access to the tide
flats. The Larsons claimed they had a right to use the
tidelands for recreational purposes based on the pub-
lic trust doctrine. Developing out of the public’s need
for access to navigable water, the public trust doctrine
protects “public ownership interests in certain uses of
navigable waters and underlying lands.”5 The doc-
trine reserves a public property interest in tidelands
and the waters flowing over them despite the sale of
these lands into private ownership. 
The Washington Supreme Court has never
considered pedestrian passage over tidelands.
Although the appeals court recognized the right of
the Larsons to access the tide flats under the pub-
lic trust doctrine for “navigation, commerce, fish-
eries, recreation, and environmental quality,” it
affirmed the dismissal of the Larsons’ claims to
pedestrian travel over privately-owned tidelands
when not covered by water. The court stated that
under the public trust doctrine, the public is
allowed to use the neighboring tidelands when
covered by water, but when the tide is out, the pub-
lic has no right to walk across private property. 
Conclusion
In sum, under Washington law, a dedicated right-
of-way laid out to navigable waters is presumed
to provide access to the water’s edge. The court also
found that the public trust doctrine does not extend
to protect pedestrian travel over privately-owned
tidelands when not covered by water.
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come. Executive Director of the Commission, Peter
Douglas, described his reaction as “Relieved, greatly
relieved,” and that with “all the threats facing the
coast, one simply cannot underestimate the enormity
of this decision.”12 California Attorney General Bill
Lockyer, who defended the Commission law, stated
that  the  “decis ion af f i rms that  the  Coasta l
Commission’s appointment structure reflects the will
of the voters who long ago declared that our coastal
resources will best be preserved for future generations
if planning decisions affecting the coast are made by
an independent body comprised of members repre-
senting a variety of philosophical backgrounds.”13
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Photograph of Brainbridge Island from the Washington State Department of Ecology.
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The trial court held that the public had a right to
access the ocean horizontally by means of a three-foot
wide strip of dry sand immediately landward of the
mean high water line, but had limited vertical access.
The court also held that Atlantis was prohibited from
charging fees for access, but it could charge reason-
able fees for services such as lifeguards. The State and
the Association appealed the trial court’s decision. 
The Appellate Division held that the public could
cross Atlantis’s dry sand beaches to access the beach
vertically from upland areas and horizontally from the
public beach bordering Atlantis’s property. With
regard to membership fees, the court held that
Atlantis could charge a reasonable fee for extended
use of the property contingent upon approval by the
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP). Atlantis appealed.
Public Access
New Jersey courts look to the following four factors to
determine whether the public has access to a private-
ly-owned beach: 
(1) Location of the dry sand area in relation to
the foreshore;
(2) Extent and availability of publicly-owned
upland sand area;
(3) Nature and extent of the public demand;
and
(4) Usage of the upland sand land by the
owner.3
The court held that these factors weighed in favor of
public access to the Atlantis property. First, Atlantis’s
dry sand is immediately adjacent to the ocean.
Second, there are no publicly-owned beaches in
Lower Township, although there is significant public
demand from residents and tourists. Finally, Atlantis
was utilizing the upland area as a commercial enter-
prise that excluded the public. Due to high public
demand, lack of public beaches, and the commercial
nature of Atlantis’s use of the property, the court stat-
ed that “the Atlantis upland sands must be available
for use by the general public under the public trust
doctrine.”4
Beach Fees
As for the beach fees,  the court affirmed the
Appellate Division’s determination that the DEP has
jurisdiction to review Atlantis’s beach fees. The DEP
has authority to issue rules and regulations govern-
ing land use within the coastal zone under the
Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA). Atlantis
planned to build a boardwalk pathway over the
dunes and the court found that this qualified as a
development triggering CAFRA jurisdiction. The
DEP also has the authority to regulate health and
safety issues, which would include the lifeguard and
other services provided by Atlantis. The DEP, there-
fore, has the authority to review fees charged for use
of the ocean and beach. However, the Supreme Court
found that the DEP does not have the authority to
regulate fees charged by Atlantis for the construc-
tion, maintenance, and rental of its cabanas and
other similar business enterprises like concessions
and beach chair rentals.
Conclusion
The court’s holding was not unanimous. Two justices
dissented, disagreeing about the application of the
four Matthews factors. The dissenters found that an
adjacent beach is available to the public and the pub-
lic trust doctrine only requires access to the ocean and
to a small beach area. While the dissenting justices
suggest a three-foot wide strip is not adequate (they
recommended a ten-foot strip), they argue that the
public should not be allowed to infringe on Atlantis’s
private property rights any further. 
The majority opinion controls, however, and
Atlantis must allow public access both vertically and
horizontally across its property. Despite this ruling,
the issue is not likely to be quieted any time soon.
Other private beach clubs with different factual situa-
tions may attempt to restrict public access in the
future. A subsequent legal challenge by the general
public may fail if a court is persuaded that the
demand for public access has been met, and that the
property has historically been held by a private entity
and used commercially. In a case involving these dis-
tinguishing characteristics, a court could potentially
find that a private beach club is well within its rights
to restrict public access.
Endnotes
1. For a thorough discussion of the Appellate
Division’s opinion, see Jennifer Simon, Not Just a
Walk in the Park: Beach Access and the Public Trust
Doctrine in New Jersey, THE SANDBAR 3:3 (2004).
2. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n v. Atlantis Beach Club,
879 A.2d 112, 116 (N.J. 2005).
3. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471
A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
4. Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass’n, 879 A.2d at 124.
New Jersey, from page 1
Danny Davis, 3L, University of Mississippi School of
Law
Earthjustice, on behalf of Public Access Shoreline
Hawaii (PASH) and the Hawaii Chapter of the Sierra
Club, drew a line in the sand on July 25, 2005.
Earthjustice has filed suit in Hawaii’s First Circuit
Court against the Board of Land and Natural
Resources (BLNR) seeking a judicial declaration
invalidating BLNR’s definition of ‘shoreline’ in its
shoreline certification rules.1 At issue: where do pri-
vate property rights on the shoreline end and public
access begin? 
All coastal states recognize the right of the public
to access coastal waters and some have granted the
public rights to areas of the beach. Under the public
trust doctrine, states hold lands underneath navigable
waters in trust for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of
all citizens. The extent of public rights under the doc-
trine varies by state. Some states are “high-water
states” and grant the public rights seaward of the mean
high water mark. Others states use low-water mark as
the landward boundary of public access rights. 
Despite a long tradition of public access, popula-
tion growth and tourism in Hawaii has increased pri-
vate development of beachfront property and the
number of public access disputes. In 1968, the Hawaii
Supreme Court held that the boundary of the shore-
line should be established as “the upper reaches of
the wash of the waves, usually evidenced by the edge
of vegetation or by the line of debris left by the wash
of the waves.” The definition of “shoreline” in
Hawaii’s Coastal Zone Management Act is very simi-
lar to the definition developed by the Supreme Court.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 205A-1 defines shoreline as “the
upper reaches of the wash of the waves, other than
storm and seismic waves, at high tide during the sea-
son of the year in which the highest wash of the waves
occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation
growth, or the upper limit of debris left by the wash of
the waves.” 
The BLNR has responsibility for promulgating
rules and regulations governing how close a private
landowner can build to the ocean. The BLNR shore-
line certification rules define ‘shoreline’ as “the
upper reaches of the wash of the waves, other than
storm or tidal waves, at high tide during the season of
the year in which the highest wash of the waves
occurs, usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation
growth, or where there is no vegetation in the imme-
diate vicinity, the upper limit of debris left by the
wash of the waves.”2
PASH claims that the BLNR’s definition conflicts
with the definition of ‘shoreline’ set forth by Hawaii’s
Supreme Court and Hawaii’s shoreline protection
statute by giving a “blanket preference for the vegeta-
tion line” because the debris line is used only if there
is no vegetation line in the immediate vicinity.  PASH
and Earthjustice argue that this focus on the vegeta-
tion line encourages private property owners to appro-
priate public beaches by artificially extending the veg-
etation line through plantings and irrigation systems.
Many groups have worked with the Hawaii
Legislature to come up with a solution to the shore-
line problem, but those efforts have stalled in the
Legislature. Earthjustice attorney Isaac Moriwake
stated he hopes this issue will be settled amicably, but
PASH and Sierra Club are willing to move forward
with the suit if needed.3
Endnotes
1. Complaint at 2-3, Public Access Shoreline Hawaii v.
Board of Land and Natural Resources, on file with
author.
2. HAW. ADMIN. R. § 13-222-2.
3. E-mail from Isaac Moriwake, Staff Attorney,
Earthjustice, to Danny Davis, Research Assistant,
Sea Grant Law Center (August 29, 2005) (on file
with author).
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Earthjustice Draws Line in 
the Hawaiian Sand
Photograph of Hawaii shoreline courtesy of NOAA’s Photo Library.
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Here are some updates on cases covered in previous
issues of THE SANDBAR.
Steward v. Dutra, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16612 (1st
Cir. Aug. 9, 2005).
Earlier this year, the Supreme Court ruled that the
Super Scoop, a dredge used in Boston Harbor, was a
vessel and remanded the case to the First Circuit to
determine whether Willard Stewart, an engineer
injured while working onboard the Super Scoop, qual-
ified for seaman status under the Jones Act. An
employee must meet three requirements to qualify as
a seaman: (1) the watercraft on which he was working
when injured must be a vessel; (2) his duties must
have contributed to the vessel’s mission; and (3) he
must have a substantial connection to the vessel.
Despite Dutra Construction Company’s arguments
to the contrary, the First Circuit found there was suf-
ficient evidence that Stewart had a substantial con-
nection to the Super Scoop and his work contributed
to the vessel’s mission. The court remanded the case
to the district court for trial on the remaining Jones
Act issues related to liability, causation, and damages. 
National Wildlife Federation v. NMFS, 418 F.3d 371
(9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2005).
In June, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon invalidated a biological opinion prepared by
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for
salmon in the Columbia River System. The court
ordered the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau
of Reclamation to provide summer spill over several
dams to avoid harm to juvenile fall chinook salmon
and other species listed under the Endangered
Species Act. The federal agencies appealed the dis-
trict court’s preliminary injunction. The Ninth
Circuit found that the National Wildlife Federation
raised “substantial questions as to whether the agen-
cies have violated Section 7 of the ESA” and there was
“no reversible error in the factual findings made by
the district court.” The granting of a preliminary
injunction was therefore proper. The Ninth Circuit,
however, remanded the case to the district court to
determine “whether modification or ‘narrow tailor-
ing’ of the order is required” to address issues that
arose after the original ruling. 
National Audubon Society v. Department of the Navy,
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 19277 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 2005).
Earlier this year, the District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina held that the U.S. Navy
had not adequately evaluated the environmental
impacts of its decision to station Super Hornet air-
craft on the East Coast near Pocosin Lakes National
Wildlife Refuge and enjoined the Navy from taking
further  action unti l  i t  fulf i l led i ts  National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) obligations. The
Navy appealed and the Fourth Circuit agreed that the
Navy’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was
deficient. The Fourth Circuit found that the Navy
had not taken a “hard look” at the impacts the new
flight operations would have on migratory waterfowl
in and around the refuge. First, the court found the
Navy’s site visits were inadequate because they were
too brief to truly observe the bird’s behavior and it
did not fully investigate the Bird Aircraft Strike
Hazard (BASH) issues. Finally, the court disagreed
with the Navy that its review of the scientific litera-
ture supported its conclusions that the new opera-
tions would not impact the birds. Although the court
determined that the Navy needed to prepare a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement
(SEIS), it cautioned that its opinion did not mean
that the Navy was prohibited from stationing the
Super Hornet in North Carolina. “We reemphasize
that potential negative environmental impacts do not
work to prohibit the selection of [the Navy’s pre-
ferred site], but those impacts must be carefully ana-
lyzed and fairly evaluated.” The Ninth Circuit
remanded the case to the district court for modifica-
tion of the broad injunction to allow the Navy to pur-
sue certain activities, such as submission of permit
applications and engineering work, while preparing
the SEIS.
Litigation Updates
Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19204 (D.P.R. Aug. 31, 2005).
Stephanie Showalter
On July 16, 2003, Linda Marie Wieditz, an experi-
enced scuba diver, died while diving near Culebra
Island in Puerto Rico. Culebra Dive Shop provided
transportation to the site and instructors. During the
dive, one of the instructors felt the currents were too
strong and ordered the divers back into
the boat. As Wieditz was attempting to
swim back to the boat, the instructor
moved the vessel towards other drifting pas-
sengers. Wieditz was never seen again. Paul
Sylva, Wieditz’s husband, filed suit against
Culebra Dive Shop and ING Insurance for
damages associated with the wrongful death
of his wife.
Waiver of Responsibility
Prior to the dive, on June 23, 2003, Wieditz
and Sylva signed waivers of responsibility
required by Culebra. Culebra argued that
Sylva’s claims were barred by the waiv-
er. Sylva does not challenge the validity
of the waiver, but he does question
whether the waiver was in effect on the
date of his wife’s dive. Culebra claimed the
waiver was simply signed in advance and
remained in effect until the dive happened.
Sylva argued that several questions on the
waiver form, such as “Last time you dove?,”
“Number of dives since you have been certi-
fied,” and “Have you taken any medication
[in] the past 24 hours?,” could lead a reasonable per-
son to conclude that the waiver was only applicable
for one day.1
Commonwealth law states that when “the terms
of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the
intentions of the contracting parties, the literal sense
of its stipulations shall be observed.”2 The magistrate
judge assigned to initially review the case found that
the waiver was not clear. The waiver does not state if
it is only applicable for the day it is signed nor is
there any reference to the number of dives it would
cover. The applicability of the waiver will depend on
the intention of the parties, a matter of fact for the
trier of facts (the jury). Summary judgment was
therefore not appropriate at that time and the case
proceeded to trial.
Coverage under ING’s Policy
Sylva filed a claim seeking third party liability cover-
age under Culebra’s ING Insurance policy. ING
argued it was entitled to summary judgment because
the policy’s “diving exclusion” barred coverage for
Sylva. The magistrate judge and district court
agreed. The ING policy expressly excludes
third party liability coverage for “liability
to divers operating from the scheduled
vessel, from the time they commence
to leave the scheduled vessel, until
they are  safely  back on board.”
Wieditz died while she was in the
water and coverage is therefore barred
by the exclusion.
Sylva, not to be deterred by the plain
language of the policy, made the intrigu-
ing argument that since he was not a diver
and not in the water at the time of his
wife’s death he could recover damages.
Culebra’s policy states, however, that it
“[does] not provide coverage for any person
for Bodily Injury, Illness, Disease, Death or
Property Damage while in the water in connec-
tion with any diving activity, or as a consequence
of any diving activity.”4 The magistrate swiftly
dismissed Sylva’s arguments as the provision
clearly “excludes claims brought by any person
‘as a consequence of a diving activity.’”5 The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of
ING because the diving exclusion barred Sylva’s
claims under Culebra’s policy.
Endnotes
1. Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21478 at *17 (D.P.R. Aug. 31, 2005).
2. 31 L.P.R.A. § 3471.
3. Sylva, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21478 at *8.
4. Id. at *9.
5. Id. at *33 (emphasis in original).
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Husband Denied Coverage for
Wife’s Scuba Diving Death
Many of us dream of traveling to distant lands to experi-
ence new cultures and view exotic wildlife and plants. If
we are lucky enough to reach our dream destinations,
how many of us stop to wonder what else might have
been on that boat or plane with us? Thankfully Alan
Burdick, senior editor for Discover, did just that and the
result of his musings and investigations is a fascinating
journey into the world of invasion biology. From the
island of Guam where scientists spend hours hunting the
elusive brown tree snake to the heavily-invaded
Hawaiian Islands where it is difficult to tell native from
alien to San Francisco Bay where species from Asia and
Europe live together seemingly in harmony, Burdick
examines the side effects of humanity’s wanderlust. Out
of Eden is in essence, as Burdick states, “a travel book
about the natural consequences of travel.”
Out of Eden is worth reading for the last chapter
alone. Burdick visits the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in
Pasadena, California where NASA’s attempts to prevent
biocontamination of space
have “created an environ-
ment that inadvertently
fosters the very kind of
life it is traveling so far beyond Earth to
find.” Twenty-two species of microbe have already been
discovered in the Spacecraft Assembly Facility. Lifeforms
created by NASA may be out there right now just waiting
to be “discovered.”
Beautifully written, Out of Eden is richly woven with
the lives and work of leading scientists. Burdick accom-
panies James Carlton on a survey of exotic species in San
Francisco Bay and David Foote as he collects drosophi-
las in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park. I felt queasy just
reading Burdick’s tales of the struggles of a graduate stu-
dent collecting ballast water samples on a rolling deck.
Out of Eden is a compelling tale of the impacts of human
travel on the environment and the scientists who have
dedicated their lives to studying them.
In his chronicle of the decades-
long fight to save the striped
bass, Dick Russell offers a first-
hand account of the interplay
of politics, public relations,
and litigation that are present
in all environment battles. The
story of striped bass is also the story of Storm King
mountain, the Westway Project, and Riverkeeper. It’s
about George Mendonsa, a powerful commercial fisher-
men appointed to the Rhode Island Marine Fisheries
Council with strong connections to Fulton Fish Market,
and Bob Pond, the guilty inventor of the Atom Plug, an
artificial lure quite popular with striped bass. It’s about
recreational fishermen who organized and fought to
save the fish they loved to catch. Russell’s account is
filled with minor and fortuitous events - late-night
phone calls, emergency meetings with government offi-
cials, newspaper articles, dinner conversations - that
often spelled the difference between victory and defeat. 
Striper Wars is truly an underdog story and Russell
has the reader pulling for the striped bass from the very
first chapter. It’s impossible not to want the little guys
to win. Striped bass tipped the scales in the seminal
Storm King case which established the right of citizen
groups to sue to protect natural resources and set the
stage for “environmental standing” - the bedrock of
almost all current environmental litigation. Striped
bass stopped a highway planned for Manhattan’s west
side known as the Westway Project because the project
would have a destroyed a significant amount of striped
bass habitat in the Hudson River. Striper Wars is an
invaluable primer on the importance and power of
common citizen action.
In the end, Striper Wars is a cautionary tale. Striped
bass may again be headed for trouble. Harvest levels
have increased over the years and bycatch mortality is a
serious problem. The striped bass’ preferred food, men-
haden, is also overfished and some striped bass show
signs of starvation. Pollution in the Hudson River and
Chesapeake Bay and habitat loss remain perennial
problems. Environmental victories take years to
achieve, but are all too often fleeting. The lessons of the
past must not be forgotten.
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Book Reviews . . . 
Stephanie Showalter
Out of Eden: An Odyssey of Ecological Invasion
Alan Burdick (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005).
Striper Wars: An American Fish Story
Dick Russell (Island Press 2005).
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One of the primary missions of the National Sea
Grant Program is to disseminate scientific informa-
tion. Two recent publications of Alaska Sea Grant,
The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands and The Gulf of
Alaska, fulfill this mission and more. The two publi-
cations, while targeting two very difference audi-
ences - the general public and scientists and stu-
dents, contribute significantly to our understanding
of Alaskan ecosystems.
Few in the Lower 48 are familiar with the Bering
Sea ecosystem, aside from some images of rogue
waves and ice-covered decks gleaned from The
Discovery Channel’s hit series The Deadliest Catch.
The Bering Sea ecosystem covers over 885,000
square miles and is one of the most biologically rich
in the world. Hundreds of species of fish, crab, coral,
marine mammals, birds, and marine plants live in
the Bering Sea providing food for each other, Native
Russians and Alaskans, and people around the
globe. The Bering Sea is also economically impor-
tant. Tourism is growing and valuable oil and petro-
leum deposits may become more accessible in the
future. The ecosystem, however, is facing major
challenges as the result of declining fish and marine
mammal populations, climate change, and pollu-
tion. The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands, funded by
the North Pacific Marine Research Program, will
hopefully raise public awareness in Alaska and else-
where about this amazing ecosystem. 
The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands is filled with
over 450 beautiful color photographs and several
informative maps
and charts. A wide range of topics
are covered including the physical environment
(volcanism, glaciers, currents), sea life, culture, and
commerce. Scattered throughout the book are side-
bars on “Sea Science” which discuss some of the pro-
jects of Bering Sea researchers like the use of remote
sensing technology to gather images of fish. The
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands comes with an audio
cd containing nine radio interviews with scientists
talking about their research in the Bering Sea, origi-
nally broadcast on Alaska Public Radio and a valu-
able addition to any library.
The Gulf of Alaska is not a publication for mass
consumption, but rather a compilation of the scien-
tific knowledge of the Gulf of Alaska Ecosystem
Monitoring and Research (GEM) Program. Billed
by Alaska Sea Grant as a “resources guide for sci-
entists, students, and managers working in the
Gulf of Alaska,” the book covers a wide range of
topics over the course of eleven chapters including
climate and weather, nearshore benthic communi-
ties, fish and shellfish, marine mammals, econom-
ics of human uses and activities, and modeling.
With an extensive References list, The Gulf of
Alaska is great introduction to the state of scientif-
ic knowledge and a good starting point for further
investigations.
Additional information about these or other
books published by Alaska Sea Grant is available at
http://www.uaf.edu/seagrant/ .
Alaska Sea Grant Publications Increase Knowledge of Alaska Ecosystems
The Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands: 
Region of Wonders
Terry Johnson (Alaska Sea Grant 2003).
The Gulf of Alaska: Biology and Oceanography
Phillip R. Mundy, ed. (Alaska Sea Grant 2005).
The Law Center is pleased to announce the publication of Stephanie Showalter's law review article: The
United States and Rising Shrimp Imports from Asia and Central America: An Economic or Environmental Issue?,
29 Vermont Law Review 847 - 876 (2005). The article presents a case study of the Southern Shrimp
Alliance's petition to the International Trade Commission for the imposition of antidumping duties on
shrimp imports. The article also discusses the environmental impacts of shrimp farms and argues that the
U.S. shrimp industry should refrain from seeking duties and instead use its political clout to secure
domestic laws restricting imports for environmental reasons. Hard copies are available upon request. 
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the original conveyance, and found the Trustees’
actions satisfied the intent requirement of incipient
dedication. 
Next, the court found the second element of
incipient dedication, public acceptance of the disput-
ed streets, satisfied. Public acceptance is established
when the municipality formally accepts the dedica-
tion or if the public physically uses the land.2 Aside
from a stipulation by both Newport Realty and the
State that the public has used North Commercial
Wharf and Scott’s Wharf for the past several decades,
the court found that the City of Newport formally
accepted the dedication. 
Newport’s treatment of the disputed streets has
been consistent with town ownership of roadways and
other public lands. The court found that Newport
officially treated North Commercial Wharf and
Scott’s Wharf as public rights of way by not taxing
the portion of the Wharf attributable to the streets
and recognizing the North Commercial Wharf as a
public street by posting official town signs, perform-
ing maintenance and upkeep, and extending the fire
department’s jurisdiction over the streets. 
Conclusion
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
Trustees of the Wharf intended to dedicate the streets
on the Wharf for public use and preserved public
access to the Newport Waterfront. Further, the court
ruled that where the public interest is at stake, the
State has the right to pursue legal action on behalf of
the public, even in seemingly local matters.
Endnotes
1. Newport Realty, Inc. v. Lynch, 878 A.2d 1021, 1033
(R.I. 2005).
2. Id. at 1034.
the State. For these reasons, the Superior Court found
that Palazzolo had no reasonable expectation that he
would be able to develop the property as he proposed.
Conclusion
The Superior Court’s determination that Palazzolo’s
development plans would be a nuisance was sufficient
to bar his takings claim. However, the Superior Court
also analyzed Palazzolo’s claim under the Penn Central
analysis finding that the denial of Palazzolo’s large
scale development plans was not a taking when part of
the property was still available for single family devel-
opment. This Superior Court decision concludes
Palazzolo’s attempt to be compensated for his unde-
veloped marshland.
Endnotes
1. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
2. The Penn Central test comes from the landmark
Supreme Court decision Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 124 (1978). In this
case the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could
not establish a taking simply by showing that they
had been denied the ability to exploit a property
interest that they had believed was available for
development. The Court established a three-part
test that serves as the principal guideline for resolv-
ing regulatory takings claims.
3. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003 (1992).
4. Seidner, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 24 A.2d 902 (R.I.
1942). 
5. Palazzolo v. State, 2005 WL 1645974, at *10 (R.I.
Super. July 5, 2005).
6. Id.
7. Id. at *11.
8. Id. at *12.
Newport, from page 3
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PUBLICATION ANNOUNCEMENT
The Bush administration recently released its proposal to reauthorize the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. According to the chairman of the White House Council on
Environmental Quality, the bill would impose tougher fines and penalties for those caught overfishing and
require more peer-reviewed science studies and better market-based decisions. Advocacy groups denounced
the bill, believing it will revoke the ten-year requirement to rebuild overfished stocks and allow the overfish-
ing of some stocks for several years before prevention measures kick in. 
Over the past 18 months, the Army Corps of Engineers has opened over 11,000 acres of wetlands in fifteen
states to development, according to a D.C.-based environmental group. Wetlands provide a buffer against
floods, cleanse groundwater, and are a critical habitat for migratory birds. Developers wanting to develop wet-
lands that are connected to navigable waterways must obtain a permit from the Corps. The Corps did not
require permits for these 11,000 acres, because of the agency’s interpretation of Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County, a 2001 Supreme Court decision. Environmental groups believe the Corps has gone beyond the
Supreme Court’s decision by allowing wetlands to be developed that are home to endangered species. A
spokesman for the Corps says that lower courts have upheld eight of nine recently challenged permitting deci-
sions, an indication that the Corps is interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision correctly. 
All eight dolphins that lived at the Marine Life Oceanarium in
Gulfport, Mississippi prior to Hurricane Katrina, have been res-
cued. The dolphins had been moved to a pool that survived Camille
in 1969 but was destroyed by Katrina allowing the dolphins to be
swept out to sea. Three of the dolphins were born in captivity and
had never been in the wild. The dolphins had some lacerations and
were as much as 100 pounds underweight but are recovering. The
Marine Life Oceanarium uses the dolphins in shows for tourists. 
Lawmakers seeking to eliminate the federal government’s ability to
protect the critical habitat of endangered species under the
Endangered Species Act are gaining unexpected support from some environmental groups and Democrats.
House Resources Committee Chairman Richard Pombo, R-Calif., is seeking to overhaul the 32-year-old
Endangered Species Act from top to bottom including eliminating the designation of critical habitat for
endangered species. Some environmental groups and Democrats are willing to give up the designation of crit-
ical habitat in exchange for other measures they believe would provide better protection of endangered
species. The Pombo bill, however, eliminates critical habitat designation without adding any new measures. 
Around the Globe
Cod stocks in the Grand Banks may be totally wiped out by illegal fishing, according to the World Wildlife
Federation (WWF). Foreign fishing fleets, disguising their cod as bycatch, are conducting most of the illegal
fishing. In 2003, 5,400 tons of cod were caught as bycatch in the southern Grand Banks, which is about 90 per-
cent of the total cod in that area. This represents a 30-fold increase in cod bycatch since the fishery was closed.
Fishermen are allowed to sell part of their bycatch, which may have led to the current abuses. The WWF is
calling on the Canada-based Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, which manages the fishery, to reduce
the bycatch of cod by 80 percent.
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Photograph of dolphins courtesy of the Center for Coastal
Environmental Health and Biomolecular Research.
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